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Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles. Once a vital com-ponent in a national economy, this sprawling urban environment is now a vast
collection of blighted buildings, an immense petri dish of both ancient and new
diseases, a territory where the rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy
in which the only security available is that which is attained through brute
power.1 Such cities have been routinely imagined in apocalyptic movies and in
certain science-fiction genres, where they are often portrayed as gigantic ver-
sions of T. S. Eliot’s Rat’s Alley.2 Yet this city would still be globally connected. It
would possess at least a modicum of commercial linkages, and some of its in-
habitants would have access to the world’s most modern communication and
computing technologies. It would, in effect, be a feral city.
Admittedly, the very term “feral city” is both provocative and controversial.
Yet this description has been chosen advisedly. The feral city may be a phenome-
non that never takes place, yet its emergence should not be dismissed as impossi-
ble. The phrase also suggests, at least faintly, the nature of what may become one
of the more difficult security challenges of the new century.
Over the past decade or so a great deal of scholarly
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of failing
states.3 Nor has this pursuit been undertaken solely by
the academic community. Government leaders and
military commanders as well as directors of
nongovernmental organizations and intergovern-
mental bodies have attempted to deal with faltering,
failing, and failed states. Involvement by the United
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States in such matters has run the gamut from expressions of concern to cau-
tious humanitarian assistance to full-fledged military intervention. In contrast,
however, there has been a significant lack of concern for the potential emergence
of failed cities. This is somewhat surprising, as the feral city may prove as com-
mon a feature of the global landscape of the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury as the faltering, failing, or failed state was in the last decade of the twentieth.
While it may be premature to suggest that a truly feral city—with the possible
exception of Mogadishu—can be found anywhere on the globe today, indicators
point to a day, not so distant, when such examples will be easily found.
This article first seeks to define a feral city. It then describes such a city’s at-
tributes and suggests why the issue is worth international attention. A possible
methodology to identify cities that have the potential to become feral will then
be presented. Finally, the potential impact of feral cities on the U.S. military, and
the U.S. Navy specifically, will be discussed.
DEFINITION AND ATTRIBUTES
The putative “feral city” is (or would be) a metropolis with a population of more
than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to
maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning
actor in the greater international system.4
In a feral city social services are all but nonexistent, and the vast majority of
the city’s occupants have no access to even the most basic health or security as-
sistance. There is no social safety net. Human security is for the most part a mat-
ter of individual initiative. Yet a feral city does not descend into complete,
random chaos. Some elements, be they criminals, armed resistance groups, clans,
tribes, or neighborhood associations, exert various degrees of control over por-
tions of the city. Intercity, city-state, and even international commercial transac-
tions occur, but corruption, avarice, and violence are their hallmarks. A feral city
experiences massive levels of disease and creates enough pollution to qualify as
an international environmental disaster zone. Most feral cities would suffer
from massive urban hypertrophy, covering vast expanses of land. The city’s
structures range from once-great buildings symbolic of state power to the
meanest shantytowns and slums. Yet even under these conditions, these cities
continue to grow, and the majority of occupants do not voluntarily leave.5
Feral cities would exert an almost magnetic influence on terrorist organiza-
tions. Such megalopolises will provide exceptionally safe havens for armed resis-
tance groups, especially those having cultural affinity with at least one sizable
segment of the city’s population. The efficacy and portability of the most mod-
ern computing and communication systems allow the activities of a worldwide
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terrorist, criminal, or predatory and corrupt commercial network to be coordi-
nated and directed with equipment easily obtained on the open market and
packed into a minivan. The vast size of a feral city, with its buildings, other struc-
tures, and subterranean spaces, would offer nearly perfect protection from over-
head sensors, whether satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. The city’s
population represents for such entities a ready source of recruits and a built-in
intelligence network. Collecting human intelligence against them in this envi-
ronment is likely to be a daunting task. Should the city contain airport or sea-
port facilities, such an organization would be able to import and export a variety
of items. The feral city environment will actually make it easier for an armed re-
sistance group that does not already have connections with criminal organiza-
tions to make them. The linkage between such groups, once thought to be rather
unlikely, is now so commonplace as to elicit no comment.
WHAT’S NEW?
But is not much of this true of certain troubled urban areas of today and of the
past? It is certainly true that cities have long bred diseases. Criminal gangs have
often held sway over vast stretches of urban landscape and slums; “projects” and
shantytowns have long been part of the cityscape. Nor is urban pollution any-
thing new—London was environmentally toxic in the 1960s. So what is different
about “feral cities”?
The most notable difference is that where the police forces of the state have
sometimes opted not to enforce the rule of law in certain urban localities, in a fe-
ral city these forces will not be able to do so. Should the feral city be of special im-
portance—for example, a major seaport or airport—the state might find it
easier to negotiate power and profit-sharing arrangements with city power cen-
ters to ensure that facilities important to state survival continue to operate. For a
weak state government, the ability of the feral city to resist the police forces of
the state may make such negotiations the only option. In some countries, espe-
cially those facing massive development challenges, even the military would be
unequal to imposing legal order on a feral city. In other, more developed states it
might be possible to use military force to subdue a feral city, but the cost would
be extremely high, and the operation would be more likely to leave behind a field
of rubble than a reclaimed and functioning population center.
Other forms of state control and influence in a feral city would also be weak,
and to an unparalleled degree. In a feral city, the state’s writ does not run. In fact,
state and international authorities would be massively ignorant of the true na-
ture of the power structures, population, and activities within a feral city.
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Yet another difference will be the level and nature of the security threat posed
by a feral city. Traditionally, problems of urban decay and associated issues, such
as crime, have been seen as domestic issues best dealt with by internal security or
police forces. That will no longer be an option.
REASONS FOR CONCERN
Indeed, the majority of threats posed by a feral city would be viewed as both
nontraditional and transnational by most people currently involved with na-
tional security. Chief among the nontraditional threats are the potential for pan-
demics and massive environmental degradation, and the near certainty that
feral cities will serve as major transshipment points for all manner of illicit
commodities.
As has been noted, city-born pandemics are not new. Yet the toxic environ-
ment of a feral city potentially poses uniquely severe threats. A new illness or a
strain of an existing disease could easily breed and mutate without detection in a
feral city. Since feral cities would not be hermetically sealed, it is quite easy to en-
vision a deadly and dangerously virulent epidemic originating from such places.
As of this writing, the SARS outbreak of 2003 seems to offer an example of a city
(Guangdong, China) serving as a pathogen incubator and point of origin of an
intercontinental epidemic.6 In the case of SARS, the existence of the disease was
rapidly identified, the origin was speedily traced, and a medical offensive was
quickly mounted. Had such a disease originated in a feral city, it is likely that this
process would have been much more complicated and taken a great deal more
time. As it is, numerous diseases that had been believed under control have re-
cently mutated into much more drug-resistant and virulent forms.
Globally, large cities are already placing significant environmental stress on
their local and regional environments, and nowhere are these problems more
pronounced than in coastal metropolises. A feral city—with minimal or no san-
itation facilities, a complete absence of environmental controls, and a massive
population—would be in effect a toxic-waste dump, poisoning coastal waters,
watersheds, and river systems throughout their hinterlands.7
Major cities containing ports or airfields are already trying to contend with
black-market activity that ranges from evading legal fees, dues, or taxes to traffick-
ing in illegal and banned materials. Black marketeers in a feral city would have
carte blanche to ship or receive such materials to or from a global audience.8
As serious as these transnational issues are, another threat is potentially far
more dangerous. The anarchic allure of the feral city for criminal and terrorist
groups has already been discussed. The combination of large profits from crimi-
nal activity and the increasing availability of all families of weapons might make
it possible for relatively small groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction. A
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terrorist group in a feral city with access to world markets, especially if it can di-
rectly ship material by air or sea, might launch an all but untraceable attack from
its urban haven.
GOING FERAL
Throughout history, major cities have endured massive challenges without
“going feral.” How could it be determined that a city is at risk of becoming feral?
What indicators might give warning? Is a warning system possible?
The answer is yes. This article offers just such a model, a taxonomy consisting
of twelve sets of measurements, grouped into four main categories.9 In it, mea-
surements representing a healthy city are “green,” those that would suggest cause
for concern are “yellow,” and those that indicate danger, a potentially feral con-
dition, “red.” In the table below, the upper blocks in each category (column) rep-
resent positive or healthy conditions, those at the bottom unhealthy ones.
The first category assesses the ability of the state to govern the city. A city “in
the green” has a healthy, stable government—though not necessarily a demo-
cratically elected one. A democratic city leadership is perhaps the most desir-
able, but some cities governed by authoritarian regimes could be at extremely
low risk of becoming feral. City governments “in the green” would be able to en-
act effective legislation, direct resources, and control events in all parts of the
city at all times.10 A yellow indication would indicate that city government en-
joyed such authority only in portions of the city, producing what might be called
“patchwork” governance, or that it exerted authority only during the day—
“diurnal” governance. State authorities would be unable to govern a “red” city
at all, or would govern in name only.11 An entity within the city claiming to be an
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official representative of the state would simply be another actor competing for
resources and power.
The second category involves the city’s economy. Cities “in the green” would
enjoy a productive mix of foreign investment, service and manufacturing activi-
ties, and a robust tax base. Cities afforded a “yellow” rating would have ceased to
attract substantial foreign investment, be marked by decaying or heavily subsi-
dized industrial facilities, and suffer from ever-growing deficits. Cities “in the
red” would have no governmental tax base. Any industrial activity within their
boundaries would be limited to subsistence-level manufacturing and trade or to
illegal trafficking—in smuggled materials, weapons, drugs, and so on.
The third category is focused on city services. Cities with a “green” rating
would not only have a complete array of essential services but would provide
public education and cultural facilities to their populations. These services
would be available to all sectors without distinction or bias. Cities with a yellow
rating would be lacking in providing education and cultural opportunities but
would be able to maintain minimal levels of public health and sanitation. Trash
pickup, ambulance service, and access to hospitals would all exist. Such a city’s
water supply would pass minimum safety standards. In contrast, cities in the
“red” zone would be unable to supply more than intermittent power and water,
some not even that.
Security is the subject of the fourth category. “Green” cities, while obviously
not crime free, would be well regulated by professional, ethical police forces, able
to respond quickly to a wide spectrum of threats. “Yellow” cities would be
marked by extremely high crime rates, disregard of whole families of “minor
crimes” due to lack of police resources, and criminal elements capable of serious
confrontations. A “yellow” city’s police force would have little regard for indi-
vidual rights or legal constraints. In a “red” city, the police force has failed alto-
gether or has become merely another armed group seeking power and wealth.
Citizens must provide for their own protection, perhaps by hiring independent
security personnel or paying protection to criminal organizations.
A special, overarching consideration is corruption. Cities “in the green” are
relatively corruption free. Scandals are rare enough to be newsworthy, and when
corruption is uncovered, self-policing mechanisms effectively deal with it. Cor-
ruption in cities “in the yellow” would be much worse, extending to every level
of the city administration. In yellow cities, “patchwork” patterns might reflect
which portions of the city were able to buy security and services and which were
not. As for “red”cities, it would be less useful to speak of government corruption
than of criminal and individual opportunism, which would be unconstrained.
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CITY “MOSAICS”
The picture of a city that emerges is a mosaic, and like an artist’s mosaic it can be
expected to contain more than one color. Some healthy cities function with re-
markable degrees of corruption. Others, robust and vital in many ways, suffer
from appalling levels of criminal activity. Even a city with multiple “red” catego-
ries is not necessarily feral—yet. It is the overall pattern and whether that pat-
tern is improving or deteriorating over time that give the overall diagnosis.
It is important to remember a diagnostic tool such as this merely produces a
“snapshot” and is therefore of limited utility unless supported by trend analysis.
“Patchwork” and “diurnal” situations can exist in all the categories; an urban
center with an overall red rating—that is, a feral city—might boast a tiny enclave
where “green” conditions prevail; quite healthy cities experience cycles of de-
cline and improvement. Another caution concerns the categories themselves.
Although useful indicators of a city’s health, the boundaries are not clearly de-
fined but can be expected to blur.
The Healthy City: New York. To some it would seem that New York is an odd exam-
ple of a “green” city. One hears and recalls stories of corruption, police brutality,
crime, pollution, neighborhoods that resemble war zones, and the like. Yet by objec-
tive indicators (and certainly in the opinion of the majority of its citizens) New York
is a healthy city and in no risk of “going feral.” Its police force is well regulated,
well educated, and responsive. The city is a hub of national and international in-
vestment. It generates substantial revenues and has a stable tax base. It provides a
remarkable scope of services, including a wide range of educational and cultural
opportunities. Does this favorable evaluation mean that the rich are not treated
differently from the poor, that services and infrastructure are uniformly well
maintained, or that there are no disparities of economic opportunity or race? Ab-
solutely not. Yet despite such problems New York remains a viable municipality.
The Yellow Zone: Mexico City. This sprawling megalopolis of more than twenty
million continues to increase in size and population every year. It is one of the
largest urban concentrations in the world. As the seat of the Mexican govern-
ment, it receives a great deal of state attention. However, Mexico City is now de-
scribed as an urban nightmare.12
Mexico City’s air is so polluted that it is routinely rated medically as unfit to
breathe. There are square miles of slums, often without sewage or running water.
Law and order is breaking down at an accelerating rate. Serious crime has dou-
bled over the past three to four years; it is estimated that 15.5 million assaults
now occur every year in Mexico City. Car-jacking and taxi-jacking have reached
such epidemic proportions that visitors are now officially warned not to use the
cabs. The Mexico City police department has ninety-one thousand officers—
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more men than the Canadian army—but graft and corruption on the force are
rampant and on the rise. According to Mexican senator Adolfo Zinser, police offi-
cers themselves directly contribute to the city’s crime statistics: “In the morning
they are a policeman. In the afternoon they’re crooks.” The city’s judicial system is
equally corrupt. Not surprisingly, these aspects of life in Mexico City have reduced
the willingness of foreign investors to send money or representatives there.13
Johannesburg: On a Knife Edge. As in many South African cities, police in Johan-
nesburg are waging a desperate war for control of their city, and it is not clear
whether they will win. Though relatively small in size, with only 2.9 million offi-
cial residents, Johannesburg nevertheless experiences more than five thousand
murders a year and at least twice as many rapes. Over the last several years inves-
tors and major industry have fled the city. Many of the major buildings of the Cen-
tral Business District have been abandoned and are now home to squatters. The
South African National Stock Exchange has been removed to Sandton—a safer
northern suburb. Police forces admit they do not control large areas of the city; of-
ficial advisories warn against driving on certain thoroughfares. At night residents
are advised to remain in their homes. Tourism has dried up, and conventions,
once an important source of revenue, are now hosted elsewhere in the country.
The city also suffers from high rates of air pollution, primarily from vehicle
exhaust but also from the use of open fires and coal for cooking and heating. Jo-
hannesburg’s two rivers are also considered unsafe, primarily because of un-
treated human waste and chemicals leaching from piles of mining dross. Mining
has also contaminated much of the soil in the vicinity.
Like those of many states and cities in Africa, Johannesburg’s problems are
exacerbated by the AIDS epidemic. Nationally it is feared the number of infected
persons may reach as high as 20 percent of the population. All sectors of the econ-
omy have been affected adversely by the epidemic, including in Johannesburg.14
Although Mexico City and Johannesburg clearly qualify for “yellow” and “red”
status, respectively, it would be premature to predict that either of these urban
centers will inevitably become feral. Police corruption has been an aspect of
Mexico City life for decades; further, the recent transition from one political
party to two and a downswing in the state economy may be having a temporarily
adverse influence on the city. In the case of Johannesburg, the South African
government has most definitely not given up on attempts to revive what was
once an industrial and economic showplace. In both Mexico and South Africa
there are dedicated men and women who are determined to eliminate corrup-
tion, clean the environment, and better the lives of the people. Yet a note of cau-
tion is appropriate, for in neither example is the trend in a positive direction.
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Further—and it should come as no surprise—massive cities in the develop-
ing world are at far greater risk of becoming feral than those in more developed
states. Not only are support networks in such regions much less robust, but as a
potentially feral city grows, it consumes progressively more resources.15 Efforts
to meet its growing needs often no more than maintain the status quo or, more
often, merely slow the rate of decay of government control and essential services.
All this in turn reduces the resources that can be applied to other portions of the
country, and it may well increase the speed of urban hypertrophy. However, even
such developed states as Brazil face the threat of feral cities. For example, in March
2003 criminal cartels controlled much of Rio de Janeiro. Rio police would not en-
ter these areas, and in effect pursued toward them a policy of containment.16
FERAL CITIES AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Feral cities do not represent merely a sociological or urban-planning issue; they
present unique military challenges. Their very size and densely built-up character
make them natural havens for a variety of hostile nonstate actors, ranging from
small cells of terrorists to large paramilitary forces and militias. History indicates
that should such a group take American hostages, successful rescue is not likely.17
Combat operations in such environments tend to be manpower intensive; limit-
ing noncombatant casualties can be extraordinarily difficult. An enemy more res-
olute than that faced in the 2003 war with Iraq could inflict substantial casualties
on an attacking force. The defense of the Warsaw ghetto in World War II suggests
how effectively a conventional military assault can be resisted in this environ-
ment. Also, in a combat operation in a feral city the number of casualties from
pollutants, toxins, and disease may well be higher than those caused by the enemy.
These environmental risks could also affect ships operating near a feral city.
Its miles-long waterfront may offer as protected and sheltered a setting for
antishipping weapons as any formal coastal defense site. Furthermore, many
port cities that today, with proper security procedures, would be visited for fuel
and other supplies will, if they become feral, no longer be available. This would
hamper diplomatic efforts, reduce the U.S. Navy’s ability to show the flag, and
complicate logistics and supply for forward-deployed forces.
Feral cities, as and if they emerge, will be something new on the international
landscape. Cities have descended into savagery in the past, usually as a result of
war or civil conflict, and armed resistance groups have operated out of urban
centers before. But feral cities, as such, will be a new phenomenon and will pose
security threats on a scale hitherto not encountered.18 It is questionable whether
the tools, resources, and strategies that would be required to deal with these
threats exist at present. But given the indications of the imminent emergence of
feral cities, it is time to begin creating the means.
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